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Abstract
We advance the approach initiated by
Chawla et al. for sanitizing (census) data
so as to preserve the privacy of respon-
dents while simultaneously extracting
“useful” statistical information. First,
we extend the scope of their techniques
to a broad and rich class of distrib-
utions, specifically, mixtures of high-
dimensional balls, spheres, Gaussians,
and other “nice” distributions. Second,
we randomize the histogram construc-
tions to preserve spatial characteristics
of the data, allowing us to approximate
various quantities of interest, e. g., cost
of the minimum spanning tree on the
data, in a privacy-preserving fashion.
1 Introduction
In a census, individual respondents give private
information to a trusted party (the census bu-
reau), who publishes a sanitized version of the
data. There are two fundamentally conflicting re-
quirements: privacy for the respondents and util-
ity of the sanitized data. Very roughly, the saniti-
zation should permit the data analyst to identify
strong stereotypes, while preserving the privacy
of individuals.
A theoretical study of the census problem was ini-
tiated by Chawla et al. [4], who presented a defin-
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ition of privacy that captures the compelling con-
cept of protection from being brought to the atten-
tion of others. As the philosopher Ruth Gavison
points out, not only is such protection inherently
valuable, but its compromise invites further inva-
sion of privacy, as every action of the target of
attention can now be scrutinized. Thus, in [4]
the goal of the adversary is to single out, or iso-
late, an individual. Very roughly, isolation occurs
when an adversary produces a description that
“looks” much more like one member of the data-
base than it does any other. Conversely, if the
adversary can only produce descriptions that si-
multaneously resemble many different members of
the database, then intuitively the adversary has
only constructed a coarse stereotype, and isola-
tion has not occurred.
Histograms are ubiquitous in official statistics,
and there is a vast literature on methods of per-
turbing contingency tables to ensure privacy. A
central result in [4] states that if the data are
drawn uniformly from a high-dimensional hyper-
cube, then a simple technique, recursive histogram
sanitization, preserves privacy: with overwhelm-
ing probability over the choice of the database, in
the absence of auxiliary information1, the prob-
ability that the adversary can isolate even one
database point is exponentially small in the di-
mension. The probability space is over the ran-
dom choices made by the sanitization algorithm
and the adversary. The proof is quite robust and
can tolerate many, but not all, kinds of auxiliary
1Information the adversary may have access to
other than the sanitized database; e.g., complete or
partial information for many of the points.
information2.
We show that the approach proposed by Chawla
et al. applies to an extremely broad and rich class
of distributions, including Gaussians and uniform
distributions on “nice” regions, such as cubes,
balls, and spheres, as well as mixtures of such
distributions. That is, we show that histograms
of data sets drawn from mixtures of such “nice”
distributions are useful, privacy-preserving, sum-
maries of the data.
Given a histogram sanitization, not only can we
learn counts, but we can also infer some informa-
tion about where points are located. This spatial
information can be exploited using known tech-
niques to approximate certain features of the data
set, such as the cost of a minimum spanning tree
on the database points or the cost of an optimal
solution to the facility location problem over the
data points. The techniques require randomiza-
tion of the histograms. Done naively this could
damage the proof of privacy. Our second contri-
bution is, therefore, to develop methods for ran-
domizing the histogram constructions while prov-
ably maintaining privacy.
1.1 Summary of Results
Review of Isolation and the Framework
of [4]. A database is a collection of some number
n of (unlabeled) points drawn from d-dimensional
space Rd. We assume a distribution D on data-
bases. The real database is chosen according to
this distribution, and is denoted RDB.
A (possibly randomized) sanitization algorithm
takes as input the RDB and produces as output
a sanitized database, denoted SDB. The SDB
may be of essentially any form, e. g., n′ points in
some space (not necessarily the same space as the
RDB), or a distribution over space. This frame-
work is sufficiently general to allow sanitization
via summaries, histograms, perturbation, etc.
The privacy adversary, called an isolator, has two
inputs: the sanitized database SDB and auxiliary
information z. The isolator may be randomized.
On input (SDB, z) the isolator produces a point
q ∈ Rd. We can think of q as a description of a
2Non-trivial sanitization against arbitrary auxil-
iary information is provably impossible for any non-
trivial notion of privacy compromise) [5].
candidate database point (q need not actually be
in the RDB; rather, it is the adversary’s guess as
to what someone in the RDB might look like). In-
tuitively, the isolator succeeds when q looks much
more like a particular real database point than it
looks like any t− 1 others. Here t is a privacy pa-
rameter describing “many.” A second parameter,
c, formalizes the degree of resemblance.
Notation. We let ||x − y|| denote the distance
between two points x and y and B(x, r) denote a
d-dimensional ball of radius r around point x.
Definition 1.1. [4] ((c, t)-isolation) Let y be
any RDB point, and let δy = ||q−y||. We say that
q (c, t)-isolates y if B(q, cδy) contains fewer than
t points in the RDB, i.e., |B(q, cδy) ∩RDB| < t.
Chawla et al. [4] investigated the privacy of a re-
cursive histogram sanitization procedure, in which
the data lie in the d-dimensional hypercube of
fixed side-length, say, 2, centered at the origin.
The procedure takes the parameter t ≥ 2 as input
and is described as follows: cut the top-level hy-
percube into 2d sub-cubes, of equal size, by split-
ting along the midpoint of each side; recurse on
every sub-cube containing at least 2t points. This
process results in a set of d-dimensional hyper-
cubes of varying sizes. The sanitization is a de-
scription of the cuts made and the exact popula-
tion of every resulting cell.
Theorem 1.1. [4] Suppose that RDB consists
of n points drawn i.i.d. and uniformly from the
cube [−1, 1]d. There exists a constant c such that
the probability that an adversary, given a recur-
sive histogram sanitization as described above, c-
isolates even one RDB point is at most 2−Ω(d),
independent of n3.
This is a powerful theorem; its weakness is that
it applies to a single unrealistic distribution on
data. This weakness is remedied here. We show
the broad applicability of the approach of Chawla
et al. by describing how to obtain histograms for
well-rounded distributions. It is then straightfor-
3Chawla et al. also gave a formal specification of
what is required from a data sanitization algorithm:
access to the sanitized data should not increase an
adversary’s ability to isolate any individual beyond
what it can do given only the auxiliary information.
In the absence of auxiliary information the theorem
above suffices.
ward to obtain privacy-preserving histograms of
mixtures of these distributions.
In the proof of the theorem, volume is used as a
surrogate for uncertainty: the adversary is given
information about the number of database points
in a cell, but from the adversary’s perspective the
location of these points within a cell is uniform.
The proof relies on a lemma stating that for ap-
propriate values of r, the volume of the intersec-
tion of a ball B(q, r) with a cell in the histogram
grows exponentially with r (the upper bound on
r depends on the diameter of the cell in ques-
tion). For this reason we need histogram cells to
be “well-rounded” (think of a ball and a strand of
spaghetti: increasing the radius of the ball gives
only a linear growth in the volume of the intersec-
tion with the spaghetti strand).
Histograms for Mixtures of “Nice” Dis-
tributions. Our constructions replace the
subcubes-based subdivision used for hypercubes
in [4] by an appropriate algorithm to subdivide
“round” cells into smaller round cells. Chawla et
al. prove that if for all points q, all radii r, and
all cells C in the histogram, one of the following
conditions holds, then the probability that the
adversary (c, t)-isolates any point in RDB is at
most ". Here P (C) denotes the parent cell of C.
B(q, cr) ⊇ P (C) or Vol(B(q, r) ∩ C)
Vol(B(q, cr) ∩ C) < " (1)
In Section 2, we prove that for the subdivision al-
gorithms described next, Condition 1 holds with
a constant value of c and " = 2−Θ(d) (see Corol-
lary 2.2 and Section 2.3). We now describe the
subdivision techniques.
In the first method, we use a deterministic decom-
position technique based on nets. Roughly speak-
ing, we choose “centers” in succession from the
cell so that they are well-spread (the distance be-
tween any two centers is not “too small”) and the
cell is tightly covered (the distance from any point
in the cell to its nearest center is not “too large”).
The subcells are then given by the Voronoi par-
tition of the cell created by the centers. We ar-
gue that the Voronoi regions are relatively well-
rounded, and so this technique gives nice privacy
constants; however, the constants deteriorate with
the depth of recursion, intuitively, because the
cells become increasingly less well-rounded.
In the second method, we again subdivide cells
by picking a set of centers and constructing a
Voronoi diagram over these. However in this case,
a carefully chosen number of centers is picked uni-
formly at random from the cell. The randomiza-
tion allows us to obtain a good embedding of the
dataset into a metric defined by the histogram,
that protects privacy as well as preserves distances
between points to a reasonable accuracy (as de-
scribed in the following section). However, the
bound on the privacy parameter c in this case, is
worse than that for the previous construction.
A third method, omitted for lack of space, embeds
the d-dimensional ball into the d-dimensional hy-
percube, and then applies the histogram sanitiza-
tion from [4] to the cube. In this case, recursion
is not a problem, but the privacy parameter c be-
comes Ω(d2).
As in [4], our techniques can handle limited kinds
of auxiliary information: even if the adversary has
complete knowledge of a subset of the points, she
cannot breach the privacy of the remaining points
with probability larger than 2−Θ(d).
Randomized Histograms. The deterministic
nature of previous histogram work allows for bad
examples in which we are unable to compute fairly
simple quantities accurately. For example, a sim-
ple arrangement of 2d points near the center of the
cube can ensure that in one step each sample is
placed in its own cell and recursion terminates, re-
porting one element in each cell. While we might
have liked to learn the diameter of the data set,
or the cost of a minimum spanning tree, the ad-
versarial arrangement prevents approximation to
within any factor.
As has been noted elsewhere, many quantities of
interest about a data set can be accurately ap-
proximated using randomized hierarchical subdi-
visions. The randomization prevents the adver-
sarial arrangements and can give strong guaran-
tees about approximate solutions.
We give two examples of randomized histogram
constructions in Section 3, one using nested cubes
for data drawn uniformly on the unit cube, and
one based on nested spherical regions intended for
data that is drawn from spherical distributions.
We will see in Section 3 that, much as randomiza-
tion enables the preservation of distances in previ-
ous work on randomized embeddings [2], random-
ization will ensure a strong connection between
the quality of approximations of certain quantities
of interest and the so-called t-radii (distances to t-
th nearest neighbors) of the database points. This
matches our intuition: our notion of privacy de-
mands uncertainty of each database point propo-
tional to its t-radius. We don’t want a solution
that provides an adversary with less uncertainty
than this.
1.2 Related Work
There is a vast literature on statistical disclosure
control and data sanitization. An excellent survey
is [1]. [4] contains a brief discussion of statistical
techniques such as suppression, aggregation and
perturbation of contingency tables, input pertur-
bation in the statistics and data mining litera-
tures, imputation, k-anonymity [13], and crypto-
graphic approaches to privacy. There is also men-
tion of interactive solutions, such as query audit-
ing and output perturbation ([6], and, the more
careful modern treatment [7, 3]). To our knowl-
edge, the only work on (non-interactive) data san-
itization, other than [4], that explicitly takes into
account auxiliary information is the lovely paper
of Efvimievski et al. [8].
There is a strong algorithmic literature on the
power of probabilistic embeddings (see e.g. [2,
10, 11]). Applications include approximation al-
gorithms, online algorithms and geometric data
stream algorithms. We refer the reader to [11, 12]
for a survey of some of these applications.
2 Histogram Sanitizations for
Round Distributions
In this section we describe how to obtain his-
tograms for round distributions, specifically, for
well-rounded regions. Assuming the sanitizer
knows the constituent distributions, it is straight-
forward to obtain privacy-preserving histograms
of mixtures by sanitizing each region indepen-
dently.
We define a standard, parameterized, notion of
well-roundedness for regions. Broadly, our ap-
proach to sanitizing a well-rounded region will be
to define a (recursive) histogram by choosing a
set of centers (points in the region, not database
points) and then subdividing the region according
to the Voronoi partition induced by these centers.
We first argue that well-roundedness of the result-
ing cells is sufficient for the privacy proof of [4]; in
particular, that Inequality 1 will be satisfied (Sec-
tion 2.1). In Section 2.2 we describe conditions
under which the Voronoi subdivisions remain (suf-
ficiently) well-rounded after recursion. Finally,
Section 2.3 describes two methods for choosing
centers that satisfy the conditions of Section 2.2.
2.1 Privacy for well-rounded cells
We start with a definition for well-rounded cells.
Definition 2.1. A cell C is said to be k-well-
rounded of radius R iff C is convex and ∃p :
B(p, Rk ) ⊆ C ⊆ B(p,R).
We now present the key lemma of this section that
relates well-roundedness to the expansion prop-
erty required for privacy.
Lemma 2.1. Let C be a k-well-rounded cell,
k ≥ 1, of radius R, and let c′ = max{2k, 2√2}.
Then, for any point q ∈ C and radius r < Rkc′ , the
following holds:
Vol(B(q, r) ∩C)
Vol(B(q, c′r) ∩ C) < 2
−( d2−1)d = 2−Θ(d)
Proof. Let p be as in the definition of well-
roundedness. First consider the case when q lies
in the ball B(p, Rk ). In this case, we will show
that the volume of B(q, c′r)∩B(p, Rk ) is large. In
particular this quantity is larger than the volume
of a cap4 of B(q, c′r) that subtends an angle of
δ = pi/3 at the center q, because c′r < R/k.
This volume can be computed as an integral over
the volume of disks of thickness c′rθ and diam-
eter c′r sin θ, with θ ranging from 0 to δ. Some
calculation shows that this volume is at least
sind δ√
pid
Vol(B(q, c′r)) > 2
−d
2d Vol(B(q, c
′r)). This im-
plies that Vol(B(q, c′r) ∩ C) ≥ Vol(B(q, c′r) ∩
B(p, Rk )) >
2−d
2d Vol(B(q, c
′r)).
4A cap of a d-dimensional ball subtending an angle
δ at the center of the ball is defined by an axis through
the center, and contains all points on the surface of
the ball that subtend an angle at most δ with the axis.
The volume of a cap is the volume of its d-dimensional
convex hull.
Likewise, Vol(B(q, r) ∩ C) ≤ Vol(B(q, r)) ≤
(2
√
2)−dVol(B(q, c′r)), as c′ ≥ 2√2. Combining
the two expressions, we get that for q ∈ B(p, Rk ),
Vol(B(q, r) ∩ C)
Vol(B(q, c′r) ∩ C) < 2
−(d2−1)d
Next consider the case when q lies outside the ball
B = B(p, Rk ). Consider the convex hull Hq of q
and the ball B. This lies entirely inside C, as C is
convex. Furthermore, apart from the ball B, the
convex hull contains a cone Λq formed by tangents
from q to B. Note that this cone subtends a large
solid angle at q. In particular, the angle between
any tangent and the line joining q and p is at least
θ = sin−1 1k (by the well-roundedness of C).
Now we can compute the volume Vol(B(q, c′r) ∩
Hq) as the union of two terms—the intersec-
tion with Λq, and the intersection with B. Note
that when q is far from p (in particular, far-
ther than
√
2R
k ), then the intersection of B(q, c
′r)
and Hq is contained entirely inside the open-
ended cone defined by Λq. This intersection
has volume larger than the volume of a cap of
B(q, c′r) that subtends an angle θ at q, which
is at least 1√
pidkd
Vol(B(q, c′r)). On the other
hand, when q is closer than
√
2R
k to p, the in-
tersection of B(q, c′r) and B has volume at least
1√
pid2d/2
Vol(B(q, c′r)) > 1√
pid(
√
2k)d
Vol(B(q, c′r)).
Therefore, we get that Vol(B(q, c′r) ∩ Hq) >
1√
pid(
√
2k)d
Vol(B(q, c′r)).
Putting everything together, we get
Vol(B(q, r) ∩C)
Vol(B(q, c′r) ∩ C) <
(2k)−dVol(B(q, c′r))
(
√
pid(
√
2k)d)−1Vol(B(q, c′r))
< 2−(
d
2−1)d
The following corollary follows from the lemma by
observing that for a point q outside C, the ratio
of volumes is bounded above by the corresponding
ratio for an appropriate point q′ in C, albeit with
(c− 1) in the place of c.
Corollary 2.2. Let C be a k-well-rounded cell of
radius R. Then for any point q and radius r, and
for c = 4k2, either cr ≥ R, or,
Vol(B(q, r) ∩ C)
Vol(B(q, cr) ∩ C) < 2
−( d2−1)d
2.2 Voronoi-based histograms
Let S be the region of interest, say, the d-
dimensional unit ball or sphere. We start with
the set S as the level 0 cell in the histogram. At
step % = 1, 2, . . . , we consider all level %−1 cells C
that contain more than t points. For each of these
cells, we obtain level % cells by subdividing the cell
as follows: we pick a set of centers in the cell, and
construct a Voronoi partition of the space induced
by these centers; this defines the next-level cells.
Let k# be defined so that cells created at level %
are k#-rounded. Different techniques for choosing
the centers yield different values for k#. In each
of these, k# is an increasing function of % (and not
the number of points or cells).
We continue the recursion for a constant num-
ber of steps, or until all the cells have fewer than
t points, and release the exact counts of points
in each cell. Assume the procedure runs for s
steps. Then each cell in this histogram is ks-
well-rounded for a constant ks. Therefore, using
the argument in the previous sections, privacy is
achieved for a constant c = 4k2s .
Definition 2.2. A set of points {p1, · · · , pm} is
said to r1-cover a set C, if C ⊂ ∪iB(pi, r1). It is
said to be r2-well-spread if for every pair of points
pi and pj, i ,= j, ||pi − pj || ≥ r2.
The following lemma gives conditions under which
Voronoi cells are well-rounded (proof omitted for
lack of space).
Lemma 2.3. Let C be a k-well-rounded cell of ra-
dius R, and {p1, · · · , pm} ⊂ C be a set of r2-well-
spread points that r1-cover C with r2 ≤ r1 < R.
Let Vi be the region containing pi in the Voronoi
partition of the points {p1, · · · , pm}. Then the
subcells Vi ∩ C are
(
4r1k
r2
)
-well-rounded with ra-
dius 2r1.
2.3 Two Methods for Choosing Centers
We now describe two methods for picking cen-
ters in cells so as to achieve the well-spread and
covering properties. This along with the results
in the previous section implies that the Voronoi-
based histograms constructed from these centers
preserve privacy.
Method (1): Picking Well-Spread Centers
Directly. We describe the procedure as applied
to a cell C. We pick points p1, p2, · · · in C in suc-
cession as follows: the point pi is picked arbitrarily
such that it is at distance at least R/4 from each of
the points pj for j < i. We stop when every point
in C is within distance R/4 of at least one of the
points pi. By construction, this gives R/4-well-
spread centers that R/4-cover the cell C. Then,
at level % of the recursion, this method gives us
k# = 4#k, where k is the roundedness-coefficient
of the original set.
We do not know how to randomize this construc-
tion so as to be able to prove that the proba-
bility of a cell boundary lying between two real
database points is proportional to the distance
between the points (necessary in order to apply
the results of the next section). This is addressed
in Method (2), although the parameter k for well-
roundedness deteriorates more quickly with recur-
sion than the corresponding one for Method (1).
Method (2): Picking Centers Uniformly at
Random. As described earlier, in the second
method, we pick centers from the cell at random.
The following lemma shows that we obtain well-
rounded Voronoi regions with a high probability.
Lemma 2.4. Let C be a k-well-rounded cell of
radius R, and let p1, · · · , pm be m = 4d8d points
picked uniformly at random from C. Then with
probability at least 1 − exp(−d), the points are
Ω(R/k)-well-spread, and R/4-cover C. Conse-
quently, the subcells Vi∩C are O(k2)-well-rounded
with radius R/2.
Using this method, we get a well-roundedness-
coefficient of k# = k2
!
at level % of the recursion,
where k is the roundedness-coefficient of the orig-
inal set.
The principal open question raised in this paper is
whether it is possible to improve the techniques or
the analysis described above to arrest the decay in
the privay parameter at deeper levels of recursion.
3 Randomized Histograms
Given a histogram sanitization, not only can we
learn counts, but we can also infer some informa-
tion about where points are located. This spatial
information can be used to approximate certain
quantities of interest, such as the cost of a mini-
mum spanning tree on the database points.
We have already noted in the Introduction that
it is easy to construct examples in which the in-
ferences drawn from the histogram sanitization
are grossly pessimistic, and that randomization
can be used to overcome this. If done carelessly,
this will yield poorly-rounded cells, hurting the
proof of privacy. In this section we show how to
randomize the histogram construction while pre-
serving privacy. We actually obtain results with
additive, rather than the more traditional multi-
plicative, error.
The histogram distance dH(x, y) between points x
and y, taken to be the maximum distance between
their two smallest containing cells, is fairly easily
bounded using the diameters of these cells. Let-
ting ∆x and ∆y be the diameters of the smallest
histogram cells containing x and y, respectively,
the triangle inequality tells us that
||x− y|| ≤ dH(x, y) ≤ ||x− y||+∆x +∆y (2)
We now consider two classes of randomized his-
tograms, and give bounds on the expected dis-
tance between any two histogram sanitized points,
via bounds on E[∆x] in terms of the t-radius of x.
As argued in [2, 10], expected distance bounds
give useful bounds on any optimization prob-
lems whose output is a linear function of inter-
point distances. Problems such as minimum span-
ning tree, facility location, and minimum weight
matching fall into this framework.
To see why expectation bounds suffice, consider
the relationship between an optimal solution on
the actual distances and an optimal solution when
using histogram distances. The actual cost of
the histogram optimal solution is at most its his-
togram cost, and as this solution is optimal for
the histogram distances this is in turn at most
the histogram cost of the actual optimal solution.
Using our bounds on expected distance increase
(Equation 2), the histogram cost of the actual op-
timal solution is in expectation not much more
than its actual cost. Therefore, the difference be-
tween the actual cost of the histogram solution
and the optimal cost is small in expectation.
3.1 Randomized Histograms on the Unit
Hypercube
We now look at a modification of the recursive
histogram approach of Chawla et al. [4], who con-
struct histograms using recursive subdivision of
hypercubes. Recall that this technique subdivides
any hypercube that contained at least 2t samples
into its 2d constituent hypercubes of half the edge
length; this process continues until each cube con-
tains fewer than 2t samples, at which point the
counts of samples in each cube are released.
To randomize this construction and yield bounds
on the expected increase in distances, we start
from a construction that has been previously stud-
ied in the metric embeddings literature. The main
idea is to conduct a standard hypercube subdivi-
sion, but on an inflated hypercube centered at a
randomly chosen point inside the original hyper-
cube. The side length of the inflated cube is twice
that of the original. This ensures that the inflated
cube completely covers the original. We can think
of this as as covering space with a mesh, say, of
edge-length 1, at an arbitrary offset from the ori-
gin. The subdivision is refined by using a smaller
mesh, say, of edge-length 1/2, without changing
the offset from the origin. Only regions contain-
ing at least 2t points are refined.
As we will see in Theorem 3.1, this random trans-
lation will provide us with utility, but it may lack
privacy. Specifically, for any cell in the histogram
the points are distributed uniformly over the in-
tersection of the cell and the unit hypercube. This
is not a problem for interior cells where the inter-
section is the cell itself, a shapely hypercube, but
those cells that intersect the surface of the hy-
percube may have very large aspect ratios leading
to distributions that have low effective dimension
and are easy to attack. To correct this, for every
level of the histogram, all cells intersecting the
hypercube surface are disbanded, and the interior
cells exposed are expanded to cover the area of
any adjacent discarded cells. The resulting sub-
division into hyperrectangular regions has guar-
anteed aspect ratios, accomodating the privacy
proofs in [4].
As noted previously, bounds on the expectation
of ∆x and ∆y suffice, which we now provide.
Let rtx denote the t-radius of a point x: rtx =
argminr{|B(x, r) ≤ t|}.
Theorem 3.1. For any sample x, letting ∆x be
the diameter of the smallest cell containing x,
E[∆x] ≤ 2min{d 32 , td}rtx log(1/rtx) .
Proof. The diameter of the smallest cell is, up to
a factor of 2, dominated by the diameter of the
smallest cell in the traditional randomized his-
togram construction, where we do not collapse
perimeter cells. We therefore shift our attention
to that construction. We consider the contribu-
tion to the expectation from each level of the
histogram. Then the total expectation is their
sum. At level i, we can upper bound the proba-
bility that the recursion will terminate from lack
of neighbors by the probability that the neighbor-
hood B(x, rtx) of x is cut by the decomposition.
To bound this, notice that it is at most the sum
of the probabilities that it happens in each of the
dimensions. In each dimension, the probability
that B(x, rtx) is cut is simply the length of the
projection of B(x, rtx) along that dimension, di-
vided by 2−i, as the separating lines are dropped
uniformly at random. Thus we get a bound of dr
t
x
2−i
on the probability of recursion terminating.
Alternately, taking a simple union bound, this is
at most t times the probability that it happens to
any one of the t nearest neighbors. To bound this
probability, notice that it is at most the sum of
the probabilities that it happens in each of the di-
mensions. In each dimension, the probability that
x is separated from y is simply the absolute value
of the length of x−y in that dimension, divided by
2−i, as the separating lines are dropped uniformly
at random. Summing these absolute values gives
us ||x− y||1/2−i ≤ d1/2||x− y||/2−i, which for each
of the t-neighbors is at most d1/2rtx/2−i. Thus
the probability that the t nearest neighbors of x
do not land in the same level i cell is also bounded
by td1/2rtx/2−i.
If this event occurs, the contribution to ∆x would
be d1/22−i, and so the expected contribution is
min{d 32 , td}rtx. There are at most log(1/rtx) lev-
els we must worry about (after which, ∆x < rtx),
yielding the stated bound.
3.2 Randomized Histograms for Round
Distributions
Recall that at any level in the recursion, we pick
m = 4d · 8d points p1, p2, . . . , pm uniformly at
random from the cell C. The clusters are the
Voronoi cells defined by these centers, i.e. clus-
ter Ci consists of all points x ∈ C such that
||x − pi|| ≤ ||x − pj|| for all j ,= i (breaking ties
arbitrarily). In Section 2.3 we showed that these
cells are well-rounded.
We now show that for any point x and any r,
B(x, r) is cut with probability proportional to r.
The main idea behind the proof is that if the dis-
tance r is much smaller than the distance % from
x to its closest center, then any point y ∈ B(x, r)
gets assigned to a different center only if this cen-
ter falls within a thin shell of thickness r around
B(x, %); the probability of this event is propor-
tional to r.
Formally, given a clustering C1, . . . , Ck and a set
S ⊆ -d, we say that S is cut by the clustering if
there are distinct indices i and j such that S ∩Ci
and S ∩Cj are both non-empty. We get:
Lemma 3.2. For any convex set C of radius ρ
with x ∈ C, ∀r, the probability that B(x, r) is cut
by a Voronoi partition of C ∈ O(dr/ρ).
The lemma states that at any level i, the proba-
bility that a ball of radius rtx around x is cut is
proportional to dr
t
x
2−i . When this happens, x lies in
a cell of diameter about 2−i. Then by the argu-
ment in the proof of Theorem 3.1, the contribu-
tion of this level to the expected cell diameter is
O(drtx). Combining this with the size of the final
cell, we get the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that the number of recur-
sive steps in the construction of the histogram is
at most k. Then, ∀x, E[∆x] = O(kdrtx + 2−k).
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